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From silence to primary definer: The emergence of an Intelligence lobby in the public 
sphere. 
 
Abstract 
 
Until the end of the Cold War the UK intelligence services were not officially acknowledged, 
and their personnel were banned from entering the public sphere. From 1989 the UK 
government began to put the intelligence services on a legal footing and release the identity 
of the heads of the intelligence agencies. In 1993 Stella Rimington, then director of MI5, 
became the first intelligence chief to give a public speech in that role. Since then, public 
engagement by those involved with the intelligence agencies has gathered pace. What this 
paper hypothesises is that there is now, in the UK, an effective intelligence lobby of former 
insiders who engage in the public sphere – using on the record briefings - to counter criticism 
of the intelligence community and to promote a specific narrative and vision of what UK 
intelligence should do, how it should be resourced, what powers it should have and how 
oversight should be conducted. 
  
Using content analysis and framing models of newspaper coverage of intelligence debates, 
this paper focusses on the three years after the Snowden revelations and indicates that a lobby 
of current and former intelligence chiefs, senior oversight appointees including lawyers and 
politicians coalesce to support the agencies’ agendas.  The paper concludes that there are 
serious political and democratic issues about the extent of the lobby’s interventions in the 
public sphere. 
 
Keywords: intelligence lobby, MI5, SIS, MI6, GCHQ, public sphere,  
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Introduction 
 
At the end of February 2015, Sir John Sawers, the former head of the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS  also known as MI6) from 2009-2014, said on the BBC Radio 4 Today 
programme it was imperative for the British security services to have more the resources. 
‘We've got to have the capability to deal with things like the hybrid warfare that we've seen 
Russia deploy, first in Crimea and then in the Donbass region. We've got to have the ability 
to deal with cyberwarfare.’ He added: ‘The whole point is to move incrementally to ensure 
that the powers and resources available to the security services, intelligence services, are 
ahead of that threat’ (Barratt 2015). In July 2015 Jonathan Evans, the former head of MI5, 
(2007-2013) wrote in the Daily Telegraph warning that ISIS posed a greater threat than al-
Qaeda and that, in order to defeat terrorism, police and spies needed better tools. ‘Against this 
background there is an urgent need to provide the police and intelligence agencies with the 
necessary powers to operate effectively in the digital sphere’ (Evans 2015). Lord Carlile of 
Berriew, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2001-2011), said in the 
Daily Mail in November 2015 that the Investigatory Powers Bill ‘gives our spies all the 
powers they need to fight terrorism in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, which have shown 
terrorists ways to hide their electronic footprints’ (Carlile 2015). These are just a few 
examples of former intelligence insiders lobbying for new resources and powerful new laws. 
Shortly afterwards, the UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, a five year plan, 
was announced in which the security services were given a major injection of funds and 
permission to recruit 1900 more officers. In 2007/08 the Single Intelligence Account (SIA), 
the combined budget of MI5, MI6 and GHQ, came to just under £1.8bn. Expenditure from 
the SIA for 2019/20 is estimated at just over £3bn (ISC 2017). In December 2016, after years 
of lobbying behind the scenes by the intelligence services in Whitehall, the Investigatory 
Powers Act (IPA), viewed by some critics as ‘draconian’, was passed into law allowing those 
agencies greater access to the public’s electronic communications.  
 
The engagement of former intelligence insiders with the ‘public sphere’, by being prepared to 
be quoted on the record on intelligence issues, was a major new development. It was all the 
more significant because,   it had been a Whitehall immutable rule that intelligence officers 
did not enter the public debate even if they were retired. Those who were or had been 
involved in intelligence were required to be publicly silent. The Spycatcher affair (1985-89) 
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was all about the government trying to prevent publication of the memoirs of a former 
dissident MI5 senior officer as a matter of principle. Since 2000, the intelligence community, 
accelerated by the so-called ‘war on terror’, have expanded rapidly. Alongside the growing 
number of  media interviews by intelligence chiefs, a cohort of former intelligence insiders 
and regulators that have increasingly been prepared to discuss intelligence issues openly and 
engage with the public sphere. This paper hypothesises they are, to all intents and purposes, a 
lobby for the intelligence services and seeks to characterise this recent development in terms 
of its impact on the public debate over the size and powers of the Secret State. 
Historical context 
Covert operations in the public sphere 
 
The British State has been noted for its penchant with secrecy compared with other liberal 
democracies, and thus has a reputation for its deep-rooted dislike of transparency (Aldrich 
2004). In the post-war years a policy of opacity was successfully maintained. The signals 
intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had operated 
since 1946 yet its existence was not revealed until thirty years later (Campbell and Hosenball 
1976). Even the existence of its wartime predecessor at Bletchley Park had only been made 
public a few years previously. There has been a longstanding UK government policy to 
‘neither confirm nor deny’ the existence of the constituent parts of the intelligence 
community or comment on their activities and operations (a policy known in Whitehall as the 
NCND). The government protected the identity of intelligence chiefs and officers and 
concealed intelligence capabilities from the public. Historically the British intelligence 
services have a long record of placing information, sometimes false or misleading but always 
to their own agenda, into the public sphere by surrogate or covert methods, often using 
trusted journalists in the UK and abroad. In the UK, as early as 1924, there was the ‘Zinoviev 
Letter’, an inflammatory document published in  the Daily Mail, four days before the general 
election. A forgery, it appeared to be a directive from the Communist International in 
Moscow to the Communist Party of Great Britain ordering the intensification of agitation 
against British democracy. It played to fears of the Soviet threat and was designed to prevent 
the election of a Labour government. The evidence suggests the forgery was planted by MI5 
officers (Jeffrey 2010, 214-222). Another example is on a much grander scale. During the 
Second World War, a global network of news agencies was set up and run by MI6 and 
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Special Operations Executive. Many of these continued during the Cold War with the aim of 
keeping a British voice in many parts of the world but also to disseminate grey propaganda 
and, if necessary, to support a range of MI6 operations (Lashmar and Oliver 1998, 72). They 
were run by the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD), closely linked to 
MI6, and which was set up under by a Labour government in 1948. Secretly financed from 
the same budget as the intelligence services, IRD was tasked to wage cultural warfare against 
communism and, later, nationalist movements.  IRD campaigned for nearly three decades 
using and supplying carefully selected journalists, politicians, academics and trade unionists 
(ibid, xv). 
 
Official intelligence leaks continued through the years to trusted journalists. Seventy years 
after the Zinoviev letter, in 1995, The Sunday Telegraph alleged the son of the then Libyan 
Leader Colonel Gaddafi was involved with Iranian officials passing off counterfeit notes and 
money laundering in Europe. When the paper could not provide evidence to back up their 
allegations they ended up paying damages in the libel action. The allegations were attributed 
to a ‘British banking official’. In the trial it became clear the information had been leaked by 
MI6, whose officers had been plying the paper with officially sanctioned material (Leigh 
2000).  The respected journalist Phillip Knightley was scathing about the value of such leaks: 
 
Those very few journalists who do have some sort of access or privilege are so jealous 
and guard it so clearly that it’s almost worthless. They’re in the pocket of the person 
who’s providing them with what information they can get (Scholsberg 2013, 138).  
 
There is no reason to assume that officially sanctioned leaks have ceased. The extensive use 
of journalists and journalistic cover by intelligence agencies in both the UK and US over the 
last 100 years has also been documented (Lashmar 2017). The secrecy surrounding the 
intelligence community propagated suspicions of the existence of a Secret State,  a   concept 
where those in power – notably politicians, the intelligence community, civil servants the 
police and  the military — wield extra-democratic  control, often covertly, over society from 
within, manipulating the public and maintaining control by surveillance and other repressive 
means. Schlesinger outlined in detail the significant features of what he saw as the 
authoritarian Secret State in the UK (1991, 33).  Keeble, drawing on Guy Debord’s Society of 
the Spectacle’, proposed that the activities of the Secret State are largely repellent, illegal, 
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extremely costly, often in support of deeply obnoxious dictatorships – and difficult to justify 
in public.  
Hence the need for the state to maintain constant vigilance and secrecy. Yet titbits of 
information are supplied to friendly media; carefully orchestrated leaks, denials, and 
lies feed the public’s curiosity about the secret service, double agents and the like 
(1997, 20). 
As a history of incompetence, bickering, defections and illegality by the UK Secret State 
emerged during the 1970s and 1980s (Wright 1987, Leigh 1988, Colvin 2009) critics 
challenged the right of the intelligence services to conduct their business with total secrecy 
and little accountability. As Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher adhered firmly to the NCND 
policy, but her Government came under sustained pressure over the intelligence services. In 
the last year of her premiership legislation was passed to constitute the security service (MI5) 
as a proper legal entity. In May 1992, her successor as prime minister, John Major, officially 
acknowledged the existence of MI6 for the first in the House of Commons (Dorril 2000, 758) 
and proposed legislation that placed MI6 and its sister organisation, the signals intelligence 
organisation, GCHQ, on a statutory footing with some parliamentary oversight.i With a 
generational change in both the public and the media the intelligence services found it harder 
to use surrogates to set frames for the presentation of the intelligence services. While 
maintaining their covert methods they conceded a new strategy of apparent openness.  
 
Opaque entry into the public sphere 
 
In the 1990s both MI5 and SIS , supported by Prime Minister Major, decided the time had 
come for the agencies to develop more formal ‘open’ relationships with some major media 
organisations. The UK intelligence community became more sophisticated in their dealings 
with the news media through discrete arrangements with news organisations and appointing 
press officers for the first time (Bakir 2015; Dorril 2015). A number of journalists have 
documented the ‘accredited journalist’ system within major UK news organisations (Bright 
2002; Rose 2007; Lashmar 2013). Keeble expresses concern over the influence of British 
intelligence on the news media in this way:  
 
While it might be difficult to identify precisely the impact of the spooks (variously 
represented in the press as “intelligence”, “security”,”Whitehall”’, or ”Home Office” 
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sources) on mainstream politics and media, from the limited evidence it looks to be 
enormous (2008). 
 
Scholars have discussed the deception during the Iraq War when official intelligence sources 
were briefing that there were Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq while unofficial 
confidential sources within agencies were briefing the evidence was very weak Even to the 
experienced eye it was hard to distinguish the official from unofficial, confidential sources. 
The news media’s use of intelligence sources is discussed in Lashmar 2013. 
 
Overt entry into the public sphere 
 
In 1993, the name of the Director General of MI5 was revealed officially for the first time.. In 
the first public talk by a serving intelligence chief, Stella Rimington gave the 1994 Richard 
Dimbleby lecture titled ‘Security and Democracy: Is there a conflict?’ Since then public 
engagement by serving intelligence chiefs has gathered pace. In addition there has been 
growing body of oversight officials. Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee was 
set up in 1996 as the primary oversight mechanism with cross party participation and has 
many former members still in public life (ISC 2017).ii  Twenty-five years later, following 
9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, the UK intelligence community is now greatly enlarged. The 
question in hand is whether the former intelligence insiders who engage the public sphere on 
intelligence matters constitute a lobby. For the purposes of this paper, a lobby is a group of 
people who campaign for specific narratives with shared desired outcomes. It does not have 
to be coordinated but must be shown to be concerted, sharing, as Bourdieu encapsulated the 
ethos, a ‘doxa’. Evidence that the lobby’s primary frames are successful in the public policy 
sphere would be useful supporting evidence for such deduction.  
 
Lobbying for intelligence 
The concept of an intelligence lobby is not new and what was to become a powerful, public 
facing lobby emerged in the United States nearly fifty years ago. After the Second World 
War the US created a network of intelligence agencies that are the now the global intelligence 
hegemon in terms of national spending, size and influence. This expansion has taken place 
with both covert and overt support in the public sphere by a lobby of politicians, former staff 
and oversight personnel. The lobby was a response to some years of systematic revelations in 
the US media from 1967 of excesses by the U.S. Intelligence. The Watergate scandal in 1972, 
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after burglars, later linked to President Nixon’s White House and the CIA, were arrested at 
the offices of the Democratic National Committee, in the lead up to the Presidential election. 
The Washington Post’s exemplary investigation was to lead to the resignation in 1974, of the 
by then re-elected, Richard Nixon. The Watergate story sparked many media investigations 
into US intelligence and resulted in the setting up of inquiries committees by the Senate’s 
under Frank Church and House of Representatives’ under Otis Pike. In the wake of their 
critical reports 1975 was to become known as the ‘Year of Intelligence’. Considering the 
flood of bad publicity the former chief of the Western Hemisphere department of the CIA, 
David Atlee Phillips, decided  the CIA would have to have an ‘acceptable’ public face, and 
non-official lobby for political and public support. Phillips had specialised in the CIA in 
propaganda was by then infamous for promoting coups against left wing regimes in Latin 
America and assassination plots against Fidel Castro and he was instrumental in setting  up 
the first pro-CIA lobbying organisation, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers 
(Olmstead 1996, 146). Not long after, President Reagan’s national security adviser, Richard 
V. Allen, bemoaned that the lobby was already formidable in its reach and influence.  
 
That they should exist as a lobby I have nothing against. However, my experience is 
trying to navigate the shoals of that intelligence lobby is that the moment you try to 
touch anything in that sacrosanct community’s organizational structure, screams of 
pain and anguish go up and epithets begin rolling (Thompson 1980, 254). 
 
On the record 
The new ‘openness’ of the intelligence community had created opportunities in the public 
sphere.  The huge expansion of the intelligence community, the ‘war on terror’ and the 
burgeoning oversight infrastructure, has meant intelligence has many more prominent public 
figures and alumni than in the past and who unlike serving intelligence staff, they are not as 
restricted in their public comments (Fang 2015). In the United States, TV channels hire 
former intelligence chiefs as commentators, for example, the former CIA head John Brennan 
was hired by MSNBC/NBC as commentator in February 2018 (Levine 2018). It is important 
to note that long before its existence was officially and legally acknowledged the UK’s secret 
state had a behind-the-scenes ability to lobby in its own interests. As the historical record 
demonstrates, spymasters have always had privileged access to those in power; whether to 
Kings, Queens, Chamberlains, Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers or Whitehall, they have 
been able to lobby for  powers and resources (Jeffrey 2010). This access extended to the 
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media and often took place in the old boy’s network in London’s gentleman’s clubs. 
Revealing accounts of this cosy interaction have been given by Chapman Pincher, the Daily 
Express investigative journalist and Donald Trelford, the Editor of the Observer from 1976-
1993 (Moran 2016, 144-5; Trelford 2017, 112).  
 
Snowden 
Although UK intelligence agencies had several reputational blows after 9/11 with the 
politicisation of intelligence over the Iraq War over the existence of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, the failure to prevent the 7/7 bombing and questions about MI6 involvement in 
torture and rendition, from 2007, in the face of the continuing so called ‘war on terror’, they 
had to some extent recovered public support.  In late 2012 Davies and Johns released a new 
public attitudes dataset to provide the first ever analysis of British public confidence in MI6 
and Government use of intelligence  and which demonstrated that the public had a relatively 
high confidence in the intelligence produced by MI6 but are extremely sceptical about how 
the Government will present that intelligence They reported: “Generally we see a fairly high 
level of confidence in the intelligence that MI6 produces, with 62 per cent of respondents 
being above the mid-point..”(2012, 679)  However, in 2013 this reputational recovery was 
delivered a body blow as a result of Edward Snowden’s revelations including that GCHQ was 
engaged in covert bulk collection of the public’s metadata from their electronic 
communications on a scale hitherto unsuspected.iii  The National Security Agency contractor 
Edward Snowden made available to the media, including the Guardian in the UK, a massive 
tranche of top secret material (estimated at 1.7m documents) that revealed that the Five Eyes 
agencies were able to conduct global surveillance. Reaction to the publication of Snowden’s 
documents were polarised and the Guardian was criticised. The Snowden documents 
revealed the Five Eyes agencies to be operating under a web of over-extended laws to 
provide legitimacy for their intrusions, laws that were never intended for covering the 
collection of metadata (Kiss et al 2013). However, in the intervening years, the intelligence 
community have been able to recover  political and public support (Dencik and Cable 2017) 
to the point that their budgets are now increased and they have tough new legal powers to 
allow them to operate a potential mass surveillance system ― most notably the Investigatory 
Powers Act (IPA). Quantifying how much impact any lobby has had on winning the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of politicians, the media and the public is difficult, except by considering whether 
they actually achieve their bureaucratic aims. To help get some measure of the impact of the 
lobby, the paper draws on the work of Cardiff University’s Digital Citizenship and 
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Surveillance Society project that examined UK State-Media-Citizen relations after the 
Snowden leaks and demonstrated that the majority of UK press coverage was pro-intelligence 
agencies rather than pro-Snowden or civil liberties. But the capture of the media does not 
necessarily mean that public opinion will follow. Miller and Dinan state that an important 
feature of their argument in their book Century of Spin is that spin, public relations and 
lobbying are not only about the ‘engineering of consent’. ‘To win the consent of the public 
might be desirable for the rulers of the world, but it is not always necessary. The key is to 
ensure public and political compliance’ (2008, 5).  
 
The Snowden revelations raised concerns about the criticality of the Parliamentary oversight 
body, the Intelligence and Security Committee, who, in an annual report published in 
February 2013 had made no mention of the massive expansion of GCHQ, as part of the Five 
Eyes network, global surveillance capability. Five months after the Snowden leaks began to 
be published, The ISC began to hold hearings on the controversy. However, by then there 
was widespread criticism of its oversight function. Liberty director Shami Chakrabarti 
claimed there were ‘structural problems’ with the ISC and questioned whether the ISC 
sessions would be a ‘PR exercise’. She complained, “There are structural problems with his 
committee, which historically has been a watchdog that makes friends and doesn’t always 
bark in the night.” (Scotsman 2013)  
 
Hypothesis 
This paper hypothesises that there is now in the UK an intelligence lobby that counters 
criticism of the activities of the intelligence community and promotes a specific elite 
narrative of what UK intelligence should do, how it is supported and how oversight is 
conducted. This paper seeks to establish the extent of these interventions, and whether they 
are providing a neutral commentary or seek certain outcomes. While acknowledging the 
opaque means by which the intelligence community has historically engaged with the public 
sphere, this paper concerns itself with the narrow question of the emergence of a lobby. As 
indicated above, the media are often embedded in the intelligence services: But for this paper 
it is reasonable to have a conceptual separation between the propagandists/sources on one 
side and the journalists on the other, even if in practice these lines can become blurred. The 
descriptor word ‘intelligence’ can be expanded to cover a wide range of organisations 
including some in the private sector. For the purposes of this paper, to keep the research 
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manageable but still credible, it considers the main intelligence services MI5, MI6 and 
GCHQ and its oversight bodies and regulators only. 
 
Primary definition 
 
To understand how the news media report intelligence, it is useful to characterise how 
journalists generally gather information to report.  An important part of the journalist’s 
skillset is using sources to identify and authenticate stories. Sources are anyone who provides 
information and/or is quoted. What concerns media theorists is how sources are selected ― in 
particular those mechanisms that allow the privileged to appear in the news on a frequent 
basis. Stuart Hall and his co-authors suggested in their widely influential book, Policing the 
Crisis, that there were a group of sources who had privileged access to the media and called 
them primary definers. These are credible individuals and institutions granted media access 
which enables their initial framing of events that are assumed to be within their area of 
competence: for example, experts, official sources, courts, leading politicians, and senior 
religious figures (1978, 58). They proposed that the existence of the primary definers 
explained how, in routine structures of news production, the media ‘reproduce the definitions 
of the powerful, without being, in a simple sense, in their pay’ (ibid, 57). Hall et al’s concept 
of primary definers attracted a good deal of debate. Schlesinger (1990) felt it did not give 
enough allowance for the subtleties of the journalism/source relationship including how it can 
change over time. Hall et al’s. framework may now be viewed as overly simple but, as Cottle 
observed, it had the advantage of, “identifying the structural and institutional linkages 
between the mass media and other centres of power ― linkages than can be examined and 
that promise to help explain the ‘hierarchies of credibility’ (Becker 1967) and the differential 
opportunities of media access granted by the mass media to contesting voices and interests.” 
(1998, 18)  
 
Confirmation of the utility of primary definition came from scholars in the US such as Hallin 
(1986) and Bennet (1990) who mapped how elite discourse dissensus affects in news 
production. Hallin analysed the coverage of the Vietnam War and examined tensions in the 
elite discourse. Bennett’s ‘indexing’ model relates how the degree of agreement or 
disagreement displayed in the news output reflects the degree to which an issue is debated by 
elites. This reinforced evidence that journalists rely on elite definitions and interpretations by 
sources to define the parameters of debate. Some seventeen years later, Bennett et al 
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confirmed the efficacy of this framework by analysis of the media coverage of the George W 
Bush administration’s foreign policy (2007).  
 
Closely linked to primary definition is source theory, as both provide explanations of how 
information enters the public sphere (Hall et al. 1978; Manning 2001; Franklin and Carlson 
2011). Schlesinger stated that the study of sources must take into account, ‘relations between 
the media and the exercise of political and ideological power […] by central social 
institutions which seek to define and manage the flow of information in a contested field of 
discourse’ (1990, 62). Anstead and Chadwick, in their study of think tank and media 
relations, stated that impartiality norms cause journalists to routinely reproduce a narrow 
spectrum of views. Thus primary definers become so embedded in news production that their 
views form the initial definitions of policy problems. These are, Anstead and Chadwick say, 
the: 
…reference points to which all further news coverage and political action must be 
seen to respond. While counter-definers may emerge over time, the possibility of 
competition pushes primary definers to maintain their status through close 
relationships with media organizations (2018).  
 
Thus, primary definers are in a strong position to set agendas and they do this often by 
picking ‘frames’ that provide the dominant narrative as to how an issue is addressed. Entman 
developed the concept:  
 
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (1993, 52).  
 
This paper also draws on previous investigations into lobbying in other sectors (Mearsheimer 
and Walt, 2006, Miller and Dinan 2008.)  Mearsheimer and Walt have specialised in 
analysing the influence of the Israeli Lobby in the United States. They said:  
 
We use “the Lobby” as shorthand for the loose coalition of individuals and 
organisations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. 
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This is not meant to suggest that “the Lobby” is a unified movement with a central 
leadership, or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues (2006). 
 
Bakir has observed most research into the relationship between intelligence agencies and the 
news media is undertaken using case studies, given the difficulties of obtaining other forms 
of data:  
 
Its popularity stems from its maximization of context and specialization in understanding 
contradictory details from multiple sources, as these are ideal attributes for unravelling 
intelligence agencies’ agenda-building processes (Bakir 2015) 
. 
That said the author, on this occasion, is using quantative methods and then content analysis 
on documented material that is publicly available and therefore the usual strictures of secrecy 
do not apply. Secrecy is not an issue as these former insiders’ comments are on the public 
record. 
 
Methodology 
 
Questions 
 
The primary research question of this paper is: 
• Does the UK intelligence community have an associated lobby that operates in its 
interest in the public sphere? 
 
Supplementary questions: 
• Does this lobby counter criticism of that community and promote an orthodox 
narrative and operational vision of UK intelligence? For example; how intelligence is 
resourced, its legal framework and how oversight is conducted?  
 
To confirm the existence of a lobby this paper needs to show that:  
1) Current and former intelligence staffs have spoken on intelligence issues within a 
consistent set of frames.  
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2) The officials and politicians who have involvement with intelligence oversight have 
spoken on intelligence issues within a consistent set of frames. 
 
This data will have to demonstrate enough engagement with the public sphere to suggest a 
concerted and strategic response that furthers the interests of the intelligence agencies. 
 
Methods 
 
Several methods are combined to test the research questions. These are content analysis of 
text news media coverage employing simply quantitative measure over time, and then textual 
analysis of the coverage of part of the sample set. The framing research focusses on the three 
years after the Snowden revelations (June 2013-2016). This was chosen because it covers 
continuing contested issues such as the ’war on terror’ but also considers the polarised 
response to the publication to the Snowden documents. Close reading of text enables the 
identification of agenda setting and framing. The approach to framing builds on work by 
Brinson & Stohl (2010, 2012) and Dekavalla (2016). The research design is to take a sample 
of prominent individuals who have had involvement with the intelligence community and 
have commented on intelligence in the public sphere subsequently. These individuals are 
either former intelligence chiefs or have been part of the official intelligence oversight 
mechanisms (and can be politicians, civil servants or from the judicial system).iv  
 
Eight prominent individuals were selected as the sample set for the study. Since those 
involved with governance of intelligence began to speak publicly there have been 
approximately 30+ public individuals who fitted all or most criteria. The sample of eight was 
chosen on the basis of a spread of criteria in terms of the agency they may have worked for, 
their oversight role and whether they were politicians or officials. Individuals had to have 
worked within or overseen the intelligence agencies.v All eight fit the Hall et al criteria for 
being a primary definer in that they are seen as credible individuals granted media access to 
enable their initial framing of events which are assumed to be within their area of 
competence. Eight can also be considered to suggest a statistically significant number to test 
the hypothesis.  
 
The sample group ― Case studies  
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1) David Omand 
Sir David Omand (born 1947) was the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator. 
Having worked at GCHQ, he was Director from 1996-97. He served for seven years on 
the Joint Intelligence Committee.  
2) John Scarlett 
 
Sir John Scarlett (born 1948) was chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
from 2004–2009 and held other intelligence related posts. He retired in 2009. 
 
3) John Sawers 
Sir John Sawers (born 1955) was Director-General of MI6 from November 2009 until 
November 2014.  Since he retired from MI6 he has become a director of the Ditchley 
Foundation and makes selected interventions around intelligence issues.  
 
4) Iain Lobban:  
Sir Iain Lobban (born 1960) joined GCHQ in 1983 and undertook a variety of roles 
before joining the GCHQ Board in 2001. Before being appointed Director, Lobban was 
Director-General (Operations); He retired on October 2014.  
 
5) Jonathan Evans:  
Lord Evans (born 1958) was Director General of MI5 from in April 2007 to April 2013. 
He joined the Security Service in 1980 and he first worked on counter-espionage 
investigations. 
6) Hazel Blears MP (born 1956) was a prominent Labour MP and served on the ISC 
from September 2010 to March 2015. She stood down as an MP in May 2015. 
7)  Lord Carlile of Berriew (born 1948) became a QC in 1984. In 2001, a former 
LibDem MP, Alex Carlile was appointed Independent Reviewer of terrorism 
legislation, a post he held until 2011.  
 
8) Malcom Rifkind  
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Sir Malcolm Rifkind (born 1946) elected as an MP in 1974 and served as 
a cabinet minister under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major. He was 
appointed chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee on 6 July 2010. Sir Malcolm 
stepped down as chairman of the committee after five years in September 2015 over ‘cash-
for-access’ claims.  
 
Nexis method 
 
The quantitative content analysis of the sample set’s public comments in the UK print media 
on intelligence issues is divided to contributions before, during and after their role in 
intelligence or regulation.  
 
For the project the Nexis database for ‘UK Publications’ was used consisting of 1070 
professional newspapers (national, regional and local), newsletters, journals, magazines, UK 
news websites, available in the UK. It is better for comprehensive coverage than the ‘UK 
National newspapers’ database, which has only 18 newspapers within its scope. Newswires 
were excluded and where possible non-relevant items like birthdays, funerals, obituaries, 
court circulars, dinners and sports events excluded by the use of operators. Website hits are 
recorded but duplication with related newspaper content discarded. Timeframes were chosen 
on the basis of each individual’s career and provide insight into their public and media 
profile. 
 
Data Grids 
 
Two grids: One grid for the five intelligence chiefs and the second for three former oversight 
officials. The first row in each case in identifies the person and then number of media 
cuttings found for that individual. With the former intelligence chiefs there are five columns, 
identifier, early career, senior career, post intelligence career and the fifth column for the 
Snowden period. The second row shows how frequently the person is quoted in these roles 
rather than just referred to, so an additional operator is used to indicate they are quoted by 
using the common terms ‘said’ or ‘says’ within five words of the name and description.  
With the three oversight appointees there are only four columns, identifier, as oversight 
appointment, post oversight and the fourth column represents the Snowden period.  It is 
worth noting that Nexis data does not become extensive until the middle of the 1990s. Given 
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the variance of individual criteria and imprecision of search operators all results are 
indicative rather than precise.  
Results 
Text analysis using Nexis search database (cut-off date 01/05/2016) UK publications. Search 
terms Column 1: name Columns 2/3/4: name and organisation. Second row: name and former 
organisation within five words before ‘said’ or ‘says’. Additional search terms used in italics 
 
Table 1:  Intelligence chiefs 
 
Name Early Career Senior career 
 
Post 
government 
service  
And Snowden 
(13/06/2013 to 
01/05/2016) 
Lord 
Jonathan 
Evans 
MI5 
Referred to 
Common name  
no viable data 
 
21/04/2007 to  
22/04/2013 
 
 
1760 cuttings 
 
23/04/2013 to 
01/05/2016 
2016 
 
317 cuttings 
 
 
 
 
 
52 cuttings  
 
Quoted 
 
Not applicable 
 
406 
 
41 
 
15 
 
Sir Iain 
Lobban 
GCHQ 
Referred to 
01/01/1971 to 
30/06/2008   
 
6 
01/07/2008 to 
24/10/2014 
 
694 
25/10/2014 to 
01/05 2016  
 
54 
 
 
 
 
336 
 
Quoted 
 
 
 >5 
 
163 
 
14 
 
77 
Sir David 
Omand 
GCHQ  
01/01/1971 to 
1/7/1996  
 
01/07/1996 to 
30/4/2005  
 
01/05/2005 to 
01/05/2016  
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Referred to 
 
13  84 395 
 
172 
 
Quoted 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
97 
 
75 
Sir John 
Sawers  
MI6 
Referred to 
 
01/01/1971 to 
16/06/2009  
 
9 
 
16/06/2009  to 
01/11/ 2014 ―  
 
1407 
 
02/11 2014 to 
01/05/2016   
 
356 
 
 
 
 
309 
 
 
Quoted 
  
>5 
 
229 
 
 
100 
 
 
104 
Sir John 
Scarlett 
MI6 
 Referred to 
(01/01/1971 to 
30/08/ 2001) 
 
11 
01/09/2001 to 
30/11/2009   
 
1367 
01/12/2009 to 
01/05/2016 ―  
 
512 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Quoted 
 
0 
 
147 
 
58 
 
6 
 
 
Table 2: Senior Oversight Appointees 
 
Search terms name plus additional search terms noted in italics 
Second row – quotes – name and post identifier’ within five words before ‘said’ or ‘says’  
 
Name 
 
As Oversight Post Oversight 
 
And Snowden 
(13/06/2013 to 
01/05/2016) 
Hazel Blears 
MP 
(01/09/2010 
to 28/02/2015) 
(01/03/2015 
to 01/05/2016) 
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(ISC) 
 
Referred to 
Intelligence and Hazel 
Blears    
187 
Intelligence and Hazel 
Blears   
114 
 
 
88 
 
 
Quoted 
 
38 
 
54 
 
23 
 
Lord Alex 
Carlile  
(IRTL) 
 
Referred to 
(11/09/2001 to 
21/02/2011) 
Independent reviewer 
and Carlile 
 
592 
(22/02/201 to 
01/05/2016) 
Independent reviewer 
and Carlile 
 
711 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
Quoted 
  
279 
 
144 
 
 
10 
 
Sir Malcolm 
Rifkind MP 
(ISC) 
 
 
Referred to 
 (06/07/2010 to 06/05/ 
2015) 
Intelligence and 
Malcolm Rifkind 
 
1930 
(07/05/2015 to 
01/05/2016) 
Intelligence and 
Malcolm Rifkind 
 
144 
 
 
 
 
 
436 
 
Quoted 
 
566 
 
932 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
Part one – Quantative - Media references 
 
The total number of results indicates a great deal of media coverage for the sample set and 
suggests that they meet the criteria to be considered primary definers. Taking David Omand 
in some detail, he is first referred to on the Nexis database on 14 November 1991. Using the 
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selector ‘David Omand’ ― as he has an unusual name this enabled a high degree of data 
veracity ― all UK Publications were searched across the dates 1 April 1971 (the start of his 
career) and 1/7/1996. He is referred to 13 times. Omand was not always in intelligence and 
the references in this period are mostly to do with his other responsibilities as a civil servant. 
He is then in senior posts until 1/04/2005 with 84 references. He rarely, if at all, was 
interviewed directly by the media before retirement. After his retirement his name with the 
‘and GCHQ’ filter from 1/4/2005 to 30/3/2016, gives 395 references listed. As can be seen 
from the grid he is often quoted post retirement. Since he retired from the civil service he is 
often referred to as ‘the former GCHQ boss/chief/head’ or ‘the former director of GCHQ’. 
Issues he is quoted on include: drones, Snowden, encryption, Scottish security, Trident and 
other non-intelligence issues. By including ‘and Snowden’ there are 172 references and he is 
quoted 75 times and close reading shows he is engaged in the Snowden debate and confirms 
Omand is one of the vociferous and active supporters for the intelligence community’s 
agenda in both Whitehall and the public sphere.  
 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind was chairman of the ISC for nearly five years. In news coverage he is 
frequently referred to in his role at ISC. He is quoted approximately 566 times in that post. 
Since Snowden, he was referenced 436 times if the search term ‘Snowden’ is added. He is 
quoted some 126 times. His position on Snowden was consistent and unequivocal. When 
asked if he thought Snowden did the world a service by exposing the extent of state snooping 
in the West, Rifkind stated ‘I don't think he is a whistle-blower… Snowden stole ― and I use 
the word explicitly ― he stole a million highly classified documents, top secret documents’. 
He adds:  
 
And he hands them over to The Guardian or other newspapers. Now that is not 
whistleblowing. That is a political act. It is a criminal act as well but it was essentially 
an expression of his own political ideology and I don't think he deserves sympathy 
(Ross 2015). 
 
Rifkind was attacked while chair of the ISC by critics for what was seen as his cheerleader 
stance towards the intelligence community (Norton-Taylor 2015). He stood down in 2015 
both as a MP and as Chair of the ISC following a cash-for-access allegation for which he was 
later cleared. Subsequently he is hardly quoted and ceases to have primary definer value.  
Lord Carlile retired as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) in 2011 but is 
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often quoted on intelligence matters. In 2016 he told the BBC Today Programme he 
supported the intelligence community’s preference not to have judges involved in the IPA 
processes saying:  
 
Judges are, of course, very good quality men and women, [but] if judges are going to 
authenticate these issues, they have to learn about national security... At the moment, 
there are a handful of judges who have real understanding of national security 
(Perrudin 2016). 
 
Hazel Blears MP was vocal as an ISC member. Quoted in the Daily Mail in March 2015, she 
said the 'two main claims' made off the back of the Snowden leaks were untrue and 
surveillance was neither blanket nor indiscriminate. 
 
What we've found is that the way in which the agencies use the capabilities they have 
is authorised, lawful, necessary and proportionate. But what we've also found is there 
is a degree of confusion and lack of transparency about the way in which this is 
authorised in our legal system. It is that lack of transparency that leads to people 
reaching the conclusion that there is blanket surveillance, indiscriminate surveillance 
(Doyle 2015). 
 
As with Rifkind here are individual patterns in each of the results. The general coverage of 
Sir John Scarlett often refers to his controversial role in politicising intelligence for the Iraq 
War. He is quoted after Snowden but he is not a frequent public speaker.  Ian Lobban does 
occasionally speak in the public sphere but not with any frequency. It was noted that many 
former senior intelligence staff are now regularly quoted on intelligence issues after 
retirement and appear to have elite access to certain section of the news media.  
Part two – Frames – setting an agenda  
To establish whether the sample group were significant in creating frames by which 
controversial intelligence related stories were debated, the following method was used. The 
‘corpus’ was created from the coverage of stories in the research period on Nexis where 
members of the sample group were cited and or quoted. The issue under discussion was 
problematized and the author noted the position of the individual in terms of support for, 
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opposition to or neutrality of the intelligence organisation’s official position or the position 
held by the responsible cabinet minister. The author then close read the corpus again to see 
whether other (non-intelligence insider) commentators provided different frames. By 
analysing the data – the articles in which the sample group are individually identified, the 
frames that are being set are identifiable as well as frames that are ignored. In each case the 
author sought to establish whether individuals were seeking to make more salient in their 
comments a frame that promoted a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment for the issue under discussion. The proposition was that if the 
frames chosen  by the individual members, support the intelligence status quo, rather than 
express any criticism or divergence, that would suggest the existence of an intelligence 
lobby.vi Close reading of the articles where case study individuals were quoted in the 
Snowden period 01/06/2013 to 01/05/2016 (last column of each grid) provides a manageable 
yet rich data set. It reveals the sample individuals engaging publicly in a range of issues. As 
Millar and Sabir have noted, messages can be analysed in terms of their relationship with 
truth and/or selectivity (2012, 78). The sample group speak to issues including terror attacks, 
intelligence powers, intelligence resources, the effectiveness of both the intelligence and 
security forces. The discussion often centres on the Snowden publication and its fall out but 
the related issues of the need for more covert data collection, cybersecurity and encryption 
problems are also often discussed. When it comes to public comments in intelligence it was 
possible to identify a number of frames that reoccurred across the study group. The six most 
dominant frames promulgated by the sample group of eight individuals are outlined below:  
Frame One: More legal powers for intelligence agencies. This was reflected in support for a 
range of legalisation most notably supporting that the Communications Data Bill (CDB) 
and/or later its successor, the Investigatory Powers Act, are a good and necessary thing. For 
example the then Chair of the ISC Sir Malcolm revealed the Committee strongly supporting 
the so-called ‘snoopers' charter’ – the Communication Data bill - for mobile phone 
companies to retain records of calls, emails and internet messages for intelligence agencies to 
use if needed. ‘We concluded that that was justifiable and necessary,’ he said (Ross, 2015). 
Frame Two: Edward Snowden’s leaks from 2013 were damaging to intelligence agencies and 
wrong. An example was Sir John Sawers, head of SIS, when appearing in front of a 
parliamentary committee in November 2013, addressed the impact of the Snowden 
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revelations (see below) by questioning the qualifications of journalists and senior editorial 
staff in deciding what can be published.  
What I can tell you is that the leaks from Snowden have been very damaging, they 
have put our operations at risk. It is clear our adversaries are rubbing their hands with 
glee, al Qaida is lapping it up (Marszal 2013).  
Frame Three: Adequate surveillance capability requires reduction in personal privacy. Sir 
John Sawers said intelligence agencies had to have access to private information:  
If you allow areas which are completely impenetrable then you might feel 
comfortable that your communications are private and no one else can see them, but 
so are those who are trying to do you down and undermine your society (Barrett and 
Freeman 2015). 
Frame Four: The intelligence agencies are effective. Sir David Omand attributed the success 
of the security services to deep cooperation between the police and national intelligence, 
information frequently volunteered from the community, a specialist team within the Crown 
Prosecution Service and US-led attacks on al-Qaida. ‘But perhaps most important of all, the 
UK has benefitted from having good - but of course never perfect - pre-emptive intelligence’ 
(MacAskill and Cobain 2015).  
 
Frame Five: The existing oversight and accountability mechanisms are effective. In 2013 
Omand said the heads of the intelligence agencies should not be directly accountable to 
parliament He did say they should make more public appearances to make it easier to see ‘the 
kind of people they are’, but that accountability was a different matter and would ‘build up 
the agency heads into something they are not’ (Rawlinson and Owen 2013).  This contrasted 
with the former Home Secretary David Blunkett who was to say that UK Intelligence 
agencies needed tougher oversight (Travis 2014). 
 
Frame Six: Intelligence Agencies are hampered by public access to encryption. For example 
in a speech at the Good Exchange cybersecurity summit in London in 2015 Lord Evans said 
that encryption technology makes things significantly harder for authorities, and that British 
spying laws needed updating (Price 2015).  
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The case study individuals almost always supported these frames when addressed. There was 
clear consensus, only very occasionally one might express minor differences. The unanimity 
of the case study group is striking but, and raise the question of whether  these the only 
appropriate frames in which to discuss intelligence? As described above an alternative set of 
frames were identified being those adopted by UK commentators in the Snowden period who 
had not worked within the intelligence community. Ignoring the counter-position for each of 
those six frames above, these frames emerged as reoccurring (an example is provided by the 
reference) and reflects a range of more critical positions.  
1) Snowden’s decision to leak may have been justified or have some justification, given 
that the growth of the surveillance had never been publicly discussed. (e.g. Kiss et al, 
2013) 
2) That Snowden was able to access the material shows how poor the Five Eyes (UK, 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand pact) security was. (e.g. Hopkins 2013) 
3) The public are justified in being worried about bulk collection or mass surveillance 
(e.g. Cusick 2013) 
4) There have been many examples of intelligence and security forces exceeding their 
powers (e.g. Cusick 2013) 
5) The then proposed Investigatory Powers Bill legislation (later enacted) needs to allow 
for the protection of sources for politicians, journalists, lawyers, priests, doctors and 
other professionals that meet the requirements of their professional bodies (e.g. 
Stanistreet, 2016). 
6) The cost of extra resources in addition to the substantial budget of the intelligence 
complex is not appropriate during austerity (e.g. Mitchell 2016). 
7) Concerns about the growth of the intelligence-industrial-academic complex. Since 
9/11 the intelligence agencies and their associated private and academic research 
capacity has grown enormously, all in great secrecy – which is why the Snowden 
leaks were such a shock. This expansion makes it harder to provide oversight on 
questions such as their effectiveness, value for money or the legality or ethical nature 
of their operations. The haystack has grown and makes it harder to spot the needle (of 
illegality, incompetence or corruption) (e.g. Plame Wilson and Wilson 2013).  
The eight case study individuals did not propose any of those alternative frames in their 
discourse.  
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Discussion 
The dataset used here is all from Nexis and therefore is from the traditional text news media, 
with some website coverage, and not broadcast media. From Google searches it is clear the 
sample set are also frequently interviewed for broadcast. Some are also closely involved in 
organisations like Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Chatham House and the Ditchley 
Foundation, influential think-tanks which have considerable impact on policy. Analysing the 
press coverage data, there is sharp increase after the Snowden publications in the frequency 
that the case study individuals are referred to and quoted with the exception of Iain Lobban 
who left GCHQ after the Snowden revelations and rarely comments in public (Oct 2014).  As 
to whether public opinion has been influenced the evidence is contradictory, but it is more 
likely that the media and politicians have been influenced (see Bakir et al forthcoming). 
Dencik and Cable of Cardiff University’s Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society 
project that the public were more pro-intelligence agencies than pro-Snowden or civil 
liberties. They describe this as ‘surveillance realism’ (developed from the concept of 
‘capitalism realism’) where those they interviewed were worried about the development of 
surveillance. 
 
At the same time, worries about privacy and the extent of (state) surveillance do not 
translate into active resistance or outcry about these developments. Rather, we see a 
kind of resignation to the overpowering nature of contemporary surveillance deeply 
embedded in everyday life and predominantly justified in terms of terrorism and 
crime (Dencik and Cable, 2017, 772). 
It is worth noting that the DataPsst! research team produced a more nuanced picture of public 
perceptions (Bakir et al 2015, 4).vii However the Cardiff team’s research supports the 
proposition that newspapers normalize surveillance by highlighting concerns over national 
security and focusing on surveillance of elites, and minimize the attention given to the mass 
surveillance of citizens.  
The prominence of opinions that justified surveillance in the name of national security 
in mainstream media is not accidental. Rather, there is evidence to suggest a longer-
standing legitimation of state interventions through a reference to concerns about state 
security in the British context. Arguments that justify the restriction of civil liberties 
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have increased in both prevalence and significance since the 7/7 attacks in London 
(Wahl-Jorgensen, Bennett and Taylor 2017, 750). 
 
What is significant is that the agencies, especially with sympathetic support from the 
government and parts of the news media, and arguably their lobby, have created a non-critical 
climate that favours extra resources and tough new surveillance laws. A direct correlation is 
hard to prove but there is some strong causal evidence here. While much of government 
spending has been subject to cuts, the intelligence budget is protected and has actually grown 
substantially year on year since 9/11 as a response to the ‘war on terror’ (ISC 2017). Various 
pieces of legislation to give additional powers to the intelligence and security community 
have gone through despite serious concerns from human rights, civil liberties and other 
critics.  The ‘Snoopers Charter’ was rejected by Parliament in 2013, but reappeared with 
tougher clauses and was passed as the IPA into law in autumn 2016.  Whether the 
intelligence community’s lobbying for additional resources and powers is necessary or has 
made them more effective is hard to judge. Secrecy prevents any external, critical public or 
fourth estate assessment. Meanwhile the lobby sets a very clear non-critical agenda for 
resourcing without additional oversight. 
Conclusions 
This paper describes how the once invisible and silent intelligence community has gradually 
entered into the public sphere over the last 25 years through increasing, if still occasional, 
interventions by senior staff, by the opaque briefing through ‘accredited reporting’ 
agreements   and interventions by an expanding body of former staff and oversight officials. 
While it is difficult to demonstrate media effects, the author believes, on the basis of the 
presented evidence, that there is now evidence of an ad-hoc intelligence lobby in operation 
with a changing cast of characters over time. All of the individuals in the case study meet the 
criteria for being a primary definer. Indeed several are sufficiently prominent that they author 
media articles.  It is likely, that outside of the agencies themselves, this is a not an organised 
lobby but a loose confederation sharing a ‘doxa’ who as primary definers are able to 
influence public policy. The UK intelligence lobby meets the criteria that Mearsheimer and 
Walt use in their work on the Israeli lobby to define a lobby. 
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Back in the 1980s the critics’ idea for post-Spycatcher openness in the intelligence 
community was that senior officers would account publicly for their organisation’s actions. 
What has also occurred is that the intelligence community and its associates have developed 
proactive organised political communication strategies to further its own ideology and aims. 
These strategies have been quite effective in deflecting criticism as we have seen with the 
Snowden affair. The author suggests that the central issue here is not to prevent past or 
present senior intelligence figures from entering the public sphere, but concern with how they 
seek to influence the public debate rather than respond to it.  Is it a two-way discussion, a 
debate about necessary resources or are they intervening to achieve the bureaucratic 
objectives of their organisation? There is a distinct lack of discussion or critique by these 
individuals when they speak publicly. While questions still hang over the effectiveness of the 
official accountability structures, the intelligence community have engaged effectively in the 
public sphere. The sample group propagate the dominant elite discourse about intelligence 
and the significance of Snowden’s documents. Underpinning the dominant discourse is the 
government’s prevailing ‘politics of fear’ rhetoric on terrorism (Miller and Sabir, 2012, 77-
92) which in turn enables the intelligence community’s lobbying for resources and powers. 
This evokes Miller and Dinan’s observation that the objective of public policy PR and 
lobbying is not necessarily to have the public agree, but that the public should not ‘effectively 
and aggressively oppose them’. ‘This is what makes a melding of ideology and action so 
powerful’ (20008, 5). Agamben, proposes that modern democracies can create a ‘State of 
Exception’ to justify its intrusive actions (2005). The question remains as to whether the 
lobby’s frames on terrorism are proportionate and whether the balance of resource provision 
and legislation is appropriate. 
 
Compared to Bennet’s research there is little dissensus in the data, and the only area where 
there was a serious disagreement was over the security implications of Brexit (October 2016) 
and this was later than the research parameters. Close reading of the data collected for this 
paper suggests the lobby are best characterised, in Johnson’s terms, as cheerleaders, and that 
regulators also risk ‘going native’. Of course, one person’s accusation of ‘going native’ can 
be countered by those accused saying they have investigated thoroughly, everything is in 
order and they are happy to publicly state that. Some, though, attract far more accusations of 
going native than others ― for example Sir Malcolm Rifkind as chairman of the ISC 
(Norton-Taylor 2015).  Using Johnson’s vivid analogies, we don’t need ostriches but we do 
need guardians as well as cheerleaders and lemon suckers.  
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Given the considerable media impact of the sample in this research this paper concludes that 
there are serious political and democratic issues about the extent of the lobby’s interventions 
in the public sphere and the growing, if opaque, power of the intelligence services. 
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